Samuel A. Adams

Samuel Alexander Adams (June 14, 1934 – October 10, 1988), known as Sam Adams, was an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He is best known for his role in discovering that during the mid-1960s American military intelligence had underestimated the number of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers. Although his position was challenged, he pushed the case within the CIA for a higher troop count. His efforts, however, met strong and persistent opposition from the Army's MACV which, in the short-term, prevailed against him.
Adams eventually resigned from the CIA, following his testimony for the defense during the 1973 prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg. In 1975 his article on intelligence appeared in Harper's. He testified before a House committee. In 1982 he was a consultant for a television documentary on Vietnam, and consequently he was named as a co-defendant in a well-known civil trial for libel, which was successfully defended. When he died, he was finishing his book about the CIA in Vietnam.

Family, education

Although he was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut, he was born into the prominent Adams family of Massachusetts. His father Pierpont 'Pete' Adams was a stock broker and member of the New York Stock Exchange. Sam Adams attended St. Mark's School in Southborough, Massachusetts. He graduated in European history from Harvard College, class of 1955. After two years in the Navy, he attended Harvard Law School, then worked for awhile in banking.

Career in the CIA

From 1963 to 1973 Sam Adams served in the CIA, mostly at its headquarters in Langley, Virginia. About the intelligence agency, he said, "I found to my astonishment that I really loved the place."

Africa division

Starting as an intelligence analyst at the Congo desk, in the CIA's new Africa Division, he read everything and talked to everybody, and "quickly became one of Washington's reigning authorities on the Congo". He wrote on its economy, but it was political turbulence in the newly independent state that drew world attention, including Cuban under Che. Adams later commented that "the Congo's problem" was "being both rich and weak at the same time."

Especially, it was for his coverage of the Simba rebellion that Adams won commendations. Although at first greeted with 'snickers' from intelligence agents at State, he successfully predicted the crisis appointment of Moise Tshombe by Joseph Kasavubu, then President of Congo. He briefed a high-level CIA conclave about the Simba and their invasion of the Congo from the east. The Simba reached Kisangani (then called Stanleyville), which prompted an intervention to rescue hostages. Tshombe was cheered "wherever he went". Adams won the esteem of analysts at CIA. As he later recalled, "It was terrific... one of the high points of my life."

Far East division

In 1965 Adams transferred to the Vietnam desk, Southeast Asia Branch of the Far East Division. He read as background then-recent books by Vo Nguyen Giap on the north's view of its earlier victory, People's War, People's Army, Bernard Fall on the French defeat, Street Without Joy, and Joseph Buttinger's history of Vietnam, Smaller Dragon. His branch chief, Edward Hauck, when asked told Adams that the Vietnamese communists would probably outlast the Americans and, after 10 or 20 years, win the war.

Viet Cong motivation

Adams, in the role of a "generalist" and "roving analyst", was given assignments concentrating on the Viet Cong. Their motivation was his initial focus. Following his procedure in the Congo, he started assembling biographies of Viet Cong operatives, but stopped when told the names were all fake. He also got nothing by reading captured documents. However, from statistics compiled in Saigon from the files of Chieu Hoi (its defector program), Adams found that VC defection rates were high (5% per year) and raising. The statistics also showed that an increase in VC killed paralleled higher defections. His report "Viet Cong Morale: Possible Indicator of Downward Drift" was ultimately published, but with caveats in its footnotes and distributed only to CIA. Feedback had been ambivalent because of widespread evidence of Viet Cong confidence and steady morale.

Order of Battle

Adams assignment in motivation led to his work in estimating the number of Vietcong guerrillas. From his research into captured enemy documents and other sources, he "concluded that previous estimates had undercounted the communists by hundreds of thousands. The implications were astounding." If the Vietcong enemy combatant count was higher, it implied that the prospects for a South Vietnamese military victory were dimmed. It questioned American claims of progress on the battlefield. It'd be "politically disastrous" for the U.S. government. This numbers dispute became known in military terms as the Order of Battle (O/B) controversy.

His findings, at first ignored, then challenged, after a heated struggle were not adopted. The Army's MACV forcefully insisted on its lower numbers, and the CIA in 1967, due to the domestic political environment, reluctantly agreed. Following the Tet offensive in early 1968, however, the controversy was revisited. The numbers of enemy combatants were raised to a higher count, more in accord with Adams' original conclusions.

Challenging the CIA

By then, Adams had resigned his Vietnam post and was doing CIA analysis of neighboring Cambodia. Yet he persisted in advancing the higher count of Vietcong in the 'Order of Battle' controversy, despite the institutional fallout between CIA and MACV. He claimed that the CIA had compromised its integrity. He filed formal charges against DCI Richard Helms. He became notorious to many in the agency, and acquired a general reputation as a "gadfly, pariah and nemesis."

In 1969 Adams, fearing that his opponents would destroy them, secretly removed CIA files and documents which would support his case. He buried them in the woods near his 250-acre (1.0 km2) farm in rural Virginia. His 1973 testimony in federal court, where he restated his position on the 'Order of Battle' numbers, caused consternation at CIA. Following this trial, he retired from the agency.

'Order of Battle' controversy

Order of Battle (O/B) schema originated in military analysis. The O/B controversy as it developed in Adams' CIA career is discussed above. In the American O/B controversy regarding the Viet Cong and the North Vietnam Army (PAVN) of the mid-1960s, Adams entered a world beyond the intelligence field. One encounters a contested arena between the largest and most powerful institutions in the American government, with multiple political dimensions. This labyrinth, and the role Adams played in it, is here further described.

Institutional context

The military takes orders from the President as Commander-in-Chief, who also influences the Army budget and officer promotion. Yet an Army's victory or defeat in war can determine the success or failure of a President's foreign policy. The Johnson Administration and the Army, particularly the MACV, arrived at the chosen strategy in Vietnam, basically a war of attrition. In order to explain the conflict to the American public, and garner their support, President Johnson and MACV coordinated around a narrative derived from the strategy. The narrative would explain the progress of the war.

In a war of attrition victory belonged to the army which methodically reduces the number of enemy combatants. It begins to wear the enemy down when the casualties it inflicts is at a rate higher than the enemy's ability to replace his losses. The 'crossover' point arrives when this rate is reached. Eventually, the enemy loses the war when he can no longer field sufficient forces to sustain the fight. Accordingly, the periodic changes to O/B numbers were a direct indication of the progress of the war.

The O/B here directly concerned the composition, the overall size and particulars, of the Communist fighting forces in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong and the PAVN. A complicating factor was the composition of the Viet Cong forces. Its conventional army was trained and armed, and full time, as were its 'combat guerrillas'. Yet there were also other categories of combatants: people with poorer weapons, or differently equipped, or less trained or in training, or who were primarily support units, or who might fight or participate only part time. "A characteristic of a guerrilla war is that the government side never knows how many of the enemy it faces." Or who, as "every Vietnamese who passes in the street could be a guerrilla."

President Johnson wanted the Army to be announcing war events that conformed to the politico-military narrative established. A steady decline in the number of enemy combatants would fit the narrative of progress toward victory. The Army for a few years had been making such 'positive' announcements. In the summer of 1966 Adams, working at the CIA Vietnam desk, found evidence indicating that the number of enemy combatants was perhaps twice that being reported.

The CIA Charter at that time gave the agency two major tasks: (i) production of intelligence for the President and executive branch, its primary consumers; and, (ii) liaison with the other intelligence agencies of the federal government in order to produce coherent, collective intelligence findings. A very large component of the American intelligence community remains the several military intelligence services. The second task of coordinating the intelligence community would result in a yearly National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Regarding the first task, the CIA had been for years providing the President with intelligence reports that were generally pessimistic on the Vietnam conflict. President Johnson had chosen to ignore much of the CIA's negative assessments.

Numbers for 1967 SNIE

The Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 14.3-67 went through 22 drafts during 1967. It was entitled Capabilities for the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. The issue as it arose thus had several components, simplified as: a) the existing war narrative, b) the prior numbers broadcast to the public, and c) what type of combatants were included in the count. In 1966 in South Vietnam, that would be: a) a war of attrition, b) about [200,000], and c) conventional and guerrilla, excluding the other categories. The Army had been counting primarily only PAVN, and VC conventional and combat guerrilla forces.

In part, this was due to the Army's view of the struggle in more conventional terms, rather than as an revolutionary insurgency fighting a political war or a people's struggle, with sometimes quite different tactics and strategies. Institutional context and political relevance of the controversy, as well as it military consequences, political tones.

As Commander-in-Chief, the U.S. President controls the Army. The Presidency, being a political office democratically elected, must address political forces at play. Johnson had made the decision to seek advice primarily from the military. His profile was more domestic with the Great Society programs, but he needed to satisfy the conservative by winning the war. The Army was stuck, however, in conventional war thinking. Johnson was, meanwhile, was accused for changing stories, and of a credibility gap.

Helms knew that the President could chose to leave him out of the inner circle loop, as he had the former DCI McCone in 1964. Moreover, Johnson was fully informed of the situation, of the dispute over the numbers, of the more likely probability of the higher numbers. Accordingly, an NIE that stated lower numbers, all things considered, would not be misinforming the President. Helms, too, considered that the Army was there fighting, killing and dying; it was their call. Also, Helms did not want to alienate military intelligence because he wanted their cooperation on an issue currently outstanding: the bombing of North Vietnam, which the CIA from the start generally considered as a poor, ineffective tactic, one that should be halted now. He allowed SAVA George Carver to agree to MACV's lower numbers during negotiations in Saigon.

Tet and recalibration

A smaller Viet Cong force could not have mounted Tet offensive. Although in the end Tet was a military defeat for the Viet Cong, it also became an unintended propaganda victory. It unexpectedly knocked out the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, as he decided shortly not to seek reelection. With his prior credibility gap, and changing stories, it was not possible for Johnson to twist the politico-military narrative. Accordingly, In the next NIE there would be a recalibration to higher numbers, to accord more with Adams. Yet the whole O/B controversy was rendered nonetheless obsolete because its raison d'être for the fudged numbers no longer existed: as political cover for Johnson's explanation of the "progress of the war" to the American public. Its was game over for Johnson in the 1968 elections. Yet this result did not satisfy Sam Adams. He apparently wanted somehow to make a permanent institutional fix that would prevent future political manipulation of intelligence. Such problems, however, seems perennial, e.g., WMD in 2002.

Adams had grown frustrated with the perversion of intelligence to meet political objectives. He believed there had been political pressures in the military to depict the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in 1967 as weaker than they actually were..After visiting South Vietnam four times between 1966 and 1967, Mr. Adams concluded that senior military intelligence officers were underestimating the strength of the enemy, perhaps by half. He argued for a higher troop count, but late in 1967 the CIA reached an agreement with the military on lower figures. Adams responded with an internal memorandum calling the agreement "a monument of deceit." In January 1968, after the Tet offensive in Vietnam, the CIA adopted an enemy count along the lines he had recommended.

Adams resigned from the CIA later in 1973, but he did not stop pushing on the issue of tainted intelligence. Key to his research had been organized data in file cards. In part it relied on South Vietnamese generated data, and extrapolation of data. It also drew from interrogations of enemy POWs, captured documents, intercepts, and photo-reconnaisance. Careful examination of Army records indicated unexplained contradictions. The was his moment of discovery regarding the politicized intelligence, in a back office at CIA HQ. In addition, apparently intelligence politically tainted (intentionally tweaked to accommodate the receiver/consumer, to facilitate continuance of set policy). There was the political primacy of 'domestic affairs' in achieving foreign results. Adams independently made a problematic political operative. Yet, his persistence resulted in a book about his activity regarding various media and his testimony at trials and before Congress.

In the media, and testimony

Outside the CIA Adams continued to advance the issues stemming from the 'Order of Battle' controversy. In particular, the tailoring of 'pure' intelligence in order to fit the political agenda of its primary consumers: the American government, and its chief executive.

Trial of Ellsberg and Russo

Adams appeared as a defense witness at the 1973 trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo. The case involved their role in the unauthorized publication of the top secret Pentagon Papers, a 47-volume, government-produced, secret history of the Vietnam War. The prosecution alleged felony violations of the Espionage Act of 1917, and of signed secrecy agreements, involving disclosure of government secrets, not to foreign powers, but to American newspapers.

Adams testified concerning the military's false numbers for Viet Cong combatants. The deliberate undercounting had been officially adopted by the American intelligence community. His testimony was offered to show that supposed 'secret information' in the text of the Pentagon Papers contained in reality many fictions.

The trial was held at the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. Eventually, citing the "totality" of government misconduct, Federal judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr. dismissed all charges against Ellsberg and Russo.

Article on CIA in Harper's

Adams did additional research. Fearful that his opponents would destroy evidence, he had already removed files and documents from the CIA, hiding them on a farm in rural Virginia. He also scouted out former contacts and CIA employees in order to bolster his cause. After his resignation from the agency in 1973, he sought the support of other intelligence officials to prove that there was a Saigon cover-up. He detailed his allegations in an article sent to Harper's Magazine. In 1975, in its May issue, Harper's published his article, "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing war with numbers". Adams brought his cause to the public.

As a result of the 'cover-up' article, Adams was sought out for further comments. He

House Intelligence Committee

Adams gave sworn testimony before the Pike Committee, of the House of Representatives. This committee was holding hearings during the latter half of 1975. Although it shed needed light on the secret operations of CIA, it also acquired controversy. His remarks were welcomed; Adams and the House Pike committee on intelligence reached similar conclusions.

CBS Vietnam documentary

In 1982 Adams provided critical evidence to CBS News reporters who made the documentary The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception. He claimed U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland had conspired to minimize reported Vietnamese enemy troop strength in 1967.

Westmoreland v. CBS

General Westmoreland in 1982 sued for libel against CBS News, and named as co-defendants the producer George Crile, correspondent Mike Wallace, and consultant Sam Adams. The case, Westmoreland v. CBS, went to trial but ended in a private, out-of-court settlement.

Adams testified "concerning the intelligence gathering and reporting of enemy strength." He told the court, "I believe there was a conspiracy. There was an attempt to do wrong with the numbers... . I have always felt that what went on in the 1967-1968 period was a conspiracy." Adams also stated, "I do not believe Gen. Westmoreland communicated fully to Washington."

Also testifying at the 1984-1985 trial were several Army officers of MACV in the mid-1960s. Then Col. (later Gen.) Daniel O. Graham (chief of MACV intelligence estimates), Gen. Joseph A. McChristian (MACV intelligence), and Col. Gaines Hawkins (chief of MACV's O/B section). The MACV O/B ('Order of Battle') estimate was "undercut" by "latter admissions" at trial that

"[The officers] had known at the time that General Westmoreland's insistence on an O/B total of no more than 300,000 was an artificial position dictated by political considerations, and that the true number of enemy forces had almost certainly been much higher."

After an 18-week trial, while the jury was beginning their deliberation, the parties negotiated and reached agreement. Evidently it was testimony "by his former chief of military intelligence" in Vietnam, which agreed more with Adams, that convinced Westmoreland to settle. The General received no money, but in a public statement each side expressed respect for the other.

The law suit ended in February 1985. In May 1993, Westmoreland appeared on NBC's The Today Show. He discussed the Vietnam war in 1967-68, and opined that the true calamity of the Tet offensive was its surprise, because the public did not know the Viet Cong's real strength. "And if I had to do it over again, I would have called a press conference and made known to the media the intelligence we had."

His book War of Numbers

Adams worked on his revising his memoirs at his home in Vermont. The book was published posthumously.

Legacy

The Sam Adams Award for integrity in intelligence, given since 2002, is named after him.